For decades, the reigning scholarly wisdom about nuclear weapons policy has been that the United States only needs the ability to absorb an enemy nuclear attack and still be able to respond with a devastating counterattack. This argument is reasonable, but, empirically, we see that the US has always maintained a nuclear posture that is much more robust than a mere second-strike capability. In The Logic of American Nuclear Strategy, Matthew Kroenig challenges the conventional wisdom and explains why a robust nuclear posture, above and beyond a mere second-strike capability, contributes to a state's national security goals. In fact, when a state has a robust nuclear weapons force, such a capability reduces its expected costs in a war, provides it with bargaining leverage, and ultimately enhances nuclear deterrence. Buoyed by an innovative thesis and a vast array of historical and quantitative evidence, this book provides the first coherent theoretical explanation for why military nuclear advantages translate into geopolitical advantages. In so doing, it resolves one of the most-intractable puzzles in international security studies.
ISBN-13: 9780197506585
Media Type: Paperback
Publisher: Oxford University Press
Publication Date: 06-01-2020
Pages: 280
Product Dimensions: 9.10(w) x 6.10(h) x 0.80(d)
Series: Bridging the Gap
Matthew Kroenig is an Associate Professor in the Department of Government and the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University and the Deputy Director of the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security at the Atlantic Council. He is the author or editor of seven books, including The Return of Great Power Rivalry: Democracy versus Autocracy from the Ancient World to the Present.
Table of Contents
Preface
New Foreword for the Paperback Edition
Abbreviations and Acronyms
Introduction
PART I. The Advantages of Nuclear Advantages
Chapter 1. Toward a New Theory of Nuclear Deterrence: The Superiority-Brinkmanship Synthesis Theory
Chapter 2. Nuclear War Outcomes
Chapter 3. The Correlates of Nuclear Crisis Outcomes
Chapter 4. The Mechanisms of Nuclear Crisis Outcomes
Chapter 5. Nuclear Deterrence and Compellence
PART II. The Disadvantages of Nuclear Advantages?
Chapter 6. Strategic Stability
Chapter 7. Arms Races
Chapter 8. Nuclear Nonproliferation
Chapter 9. The Defense Budget
Conclusion
Notes
Bibliography
Index
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